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Allen: In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: An Interest-B

NOTES
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
AN INTEREST-BALANCING TEST
The extent of a state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations is a continually recurring and confusing question in American law., A milestone
in this area was reached when the Supreme Court decided InternationalShoe
Co. v. Washington.2 In that case the Court held that due process did not
preclude jurisdiction over foreign defendants provided the defendant had
such "minimum contacts" with the forum state that maintenance of the suit
did not offend "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' '
A test phrased in terms of "minimum contacts," "fair play," and "substantial
"

justice" promised no greater concreteness than the prior tests,4 but it did

promise new emphasis on fairness in results.5 Unfortunately, this promise
has only been partially fulfilled, for subsequent case law has focused primarily
on formulating and weighing the technical "contacts" and only secondarily
on the general goals of fairness and substantial justice. The purpose of this
note is to analyze InternationalShoe and its progeny in order to delineate an
interest-balancing test that will assure primary emphasis on the ultimate goal
of fairness. Such a test is vital to the correct application of the federal due
process standard announced in International Shoe. In addition, such a test
is useful in interpreting numerous state statutes that have attempted to implement the due process standard of InternationalShoe.0 The need for such
an interest-balancing test in the interpretation of these statutes will be
illustrated by Florida law. Florida's experience exemplifies the usual pitfalls
that a state's legislature and judiciary face in expanding a state's jurisdiction
to take advantage of the new enclave of power over foreign corporations
created by International Shoe. In analyzing the Florida experience, two
further problems will be resolved. First, should a state utilize the full power
allowed by InternationalShoe or a lesser degree of this power? Second, once
the appropriate degree of jurisdictional power is ascertained, what is the
best method for implementing this power?
InternationalShoe's STANDARD: ITS BACKGROUND, ITS IMPACT

InternationalShoe's impact on state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
can only be evaluated in light of previous legal developments. The early
legal conception of a corporation was that of an artificial person existing
only within the state of incorporation.7 This conception, coupled with the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Chase
6.
7.

See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
326 US. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316.
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1930).
See Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1948); Hutchinson v.
&Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
See notes 29, 30 infra.
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (dictum).
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requirement that the defendant had to be personally served within the state
that attempted to assert jurisdiction, 8 limited the corporation's amenability to
suit to the state of incorporation.9 As corporate transactions expanded across
state boundaries, such a narrow scope of jurisdiction became untenable. 10
Consequently, courts developed new legal theories to broaden corporate
amenability to suit." The earliest theory was that the corporation impliedly
consented to suit in the state where it was "doing business."' 2 A second
theory was that the corporation was "present" and therefore amenable to
suit in any state where it was "doing business."" s This "presence" theory contradicted the concept that a corporation existed only in the state of incorpora14
tion, and thus its acceptance lagged behind the implied consent theory.
1
Since "doing business" was the pivotal factor in both theories, " a large and
complicated body of law developed to define this term.16 Illustrative of this
complexity was the controversy over the degree of solicitation necessary to
constitute "doing business." At first, the Supreme Court held that solicitation
alone did not constitute doing business.17 Subsequent cases qualified this
holding so that "solicitation plus" some additional activity would sustain
jurisdiction.'s
Against this fictional and conceptualistic background International Shoe
was decided.' 9 International Shoe, the defendant, was a Delaware corporation
whose principal place of business was in St. Louis, Missouri. The corporation
maintained resident salesmen in the state of Washington to solicit orders.
The state brought suit in a Washington court for unpaid unemployment
compensation contributions connected with the salaries of the defendant's
salesmen. International Shoe defended by attacking the state's in personam
jurisdiction, asserting that its business activities in Washington were not
sufficient to satisfy the "presence" test. The Supreme Court of Washington
relied on the solicitation-plus rule and sustained jurisdiction.20 On appeal
the Supreme Court dismissed the former legal theories of "presence" and
"consent" as mere symbolizations of the degree of activity required to satisfy

8. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877).
9. A. EIIRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 111 (1962).
10. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
11. Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 919 (1960).
12. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899); Lafayette Ins. Co.
v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
13. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
14. Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1960).
15. See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583, 589 (1914).
16. A fair sampling of the cases is provided by Judge Learned Hand in Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
17. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); see International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
18. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Walsh v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 256 F. 47 (D. Mass. 1916); see Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations-An
Analysis of Due Process, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 393 (1955).
19. See Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33, 87 (2d Cir. 1948).
20. International Shoe Co. v. State, 22 Wash. 2d 146, 159-70, 154 P.2d 801, 812 (1948).
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the requirements of due process.2 1 Instead, Mr. Chief Justice Stone con2
cluded:2
jD]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."
In applying this test a number of factors were considered: the continuity of
of a corporation's activity in the state, an "estimate of the inconvenience"
to the corporation in defending the suit, the volume of business conducted,
and whether the cause of action arose out of the corporation's activity within
the state. 23 Mr. Chief Justice Stone concluded that a mechanical or quantitative analysis of these factors was inappropriate. Instead, their quality and
nature had to be considered.2 4
Several aspects of the case are important. First, no precise test was
formulated since in each case a consideration of the "quality and nature"
of the individual facts was necessary. Thus, the question of jurisdiction became primarily a factual determination for the trial court.25 Second, the
decision did not overrule previous cases but instead reformulated the jurisdictional test to include a greater number of factual situations. 2 1 Finally,
the due process test remained vague.2 7 Mr. Chief Justice Stone had probed
behind the symbolizations of "presence" and "consent" to formulate a test
of reasonableness and fairness based on an analysis of "minimal contacts."
But the opinion failed to go further and explain why the presence of certain
"contacts" would permit a fair and reasonable assertion of jurisdiction. Although any test of fairness or reasonableness depends on the balancing of
various interests, 28 the only underlying interest mentioned in the opinion was
convenience to the corporate defendant. An explication of the underlying interests to be balanced, interests whose presence or absence would be indicated
by the factual contacts analyzed, was missing. In other words, International
Shoe formulated a test of "fairness" without enunciating the interests that
must be balanced in order to reach a fair result in each case.
21. 326 U.S. at 316-17.
22. Id. at 316.
23. Id. at 317, 320.
24. Id. at 319.
25. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 569, 610 (1958).
26. Id. at 589; Note, The Growth of the InternationalShoe Doctrine, 16 U. Cm. L. Rlv.
523, 525 (1949). For cases recognizing an expansive trend in state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations see, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
27. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930); Stimson,
Omnibus Statutes Designed To Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 48 A.B.AJ.
725 (1962).
28. See Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 924
(1960); Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. Cm. L. REV. 523, 524
(1949).
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Despite its vagueness, the test formulated in International Shoe has had
an expansive and continuing impact on state jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Many states passed new jurisdictional statutes specifying certain
minimum contacts; 29 other states amended their previous "doing business"
statutes.3 0 To the extent these statutes implemented the "minimum contacts"
test, the reasoning underlying that test is equally applicable in their interpretation. The new due process test also liberalized judicial interpretations of
pre-InternationalShoe "doing business" statutes that were not amended. The
conceptualistic approach formerly used to interpret these statutes has been
replaced by "a 'reasonable and just' interpretation of 'doing business.'-31
INTERESTS THAT ARE BALANCED

To

REACH A RESULT OF "FAIR PLAY

AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE"

Successful use of the "minimal contacts" test to reach consistent and
reasonable results depends on the judiciary's ability to recognize and balance
underlying interests. The courts' success in this interest-analysis has not been
impressive because they have, for the most part, merely formulated new
factual contacts. Examples of these ever-multiplying factual contacts are:
registration by a foreign corporation of its product under a state's commercial
poisons law, 32 recording of a conditional sales contract in the state 3

3

the

dollar amount of damages inflicted on the local plaintiff,34 whether the
locally sold product is dangerous,3 5 the place where the contract was made
or was to be performed,36 and whether the foreign corporation's subsidiary
in the forum state is an independent corporate entity.3

T

After enumerating

and weighing factual contacts of this nature, the courts often conclude simply
that on the presented facts, assertion of jurisdiction does or does not violate
"fair play and substantial justice."3 This superficial analysis ignores the
fact that factual contacts are important only in indicating the presence or
29. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); N.Y. Civ. PnAc. LAW
§302 (McKinney Supp. 1966); UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROcEDURE ACT
§1.03 [adopted: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§27-2501 to -2507 (1963), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§1701.01-1706.04 (1965), V.I. CODE tit. 5, §§4901-43 (1965)]; Note, Single Act Statutes and
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 43 VA. L. REV. 1105 (1957).
30.

See statutes collected in RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

CONFLICT OF LAws, Reporter's Note

§84, at 96 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
31. Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IOWA L. REV. 345,
359 (1959).
32. W. H. Elliot & Sons v. Nuodex Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957).
33. Hoagland v. Springer, 39 N.J. 32, 186 A.2d 679 (1962).
34. Cf. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
35. Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Hoagland v. Springer,
75 N.J. Super. 560, 183 A.2d 678 (App. Div.), af'd, 39 N.J. 32, 186 A.2d 679 (1962).
36. S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 348 U.S. 983 (1955).
37. Dowd v. Boro Drugs, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 488, 176 A.2d 13 (App. Div. 1961).
38. E.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Jenkins v. Dell
Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955); S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277
P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 348 U.S. 983 (1955).
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absence of underlying interests. Use of factual contacts alone, without underlying interests, may well result in inconsistent and unfair results.
While most courts have concentrated on factual contacts, a minority led
by the Supreme Court has attempted to recognize and balance underlying
interests. Four major interests have evolved: inconvenience of the corporate
defendant, inconvenience of the plaintiff, interests of the forum state, and
interest in efficient judicial administration.
Inconvenience of the CorporationDefendant
Inconvenience of the corporate defendant is the primary interest from a
constitutional perspective. The due process limitation 3 9 on state jurisdiction
is designed to protect defendants from having to defend burdensome actions
40
in distant state tribunals.
An early emphasis on inconvenience of the corporate defendant has decreased as a new economic conception of the corporate enterprise has developed.41 Courts have shifted their focus from the corporation's administrative or productive situs to the situs of the corporation's markets. Logically,
a corporation that derives profits from a foreign state market should not
argue the inconvenience of defending in the foreign state where profits necessary for its continued corporate existence are produced.42 This focus on the
corporation's markets is illustrated by Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp.43 In that case the defendant Ohio corporation sold valves
to a Pennsylvania corporation that placed them in water heaters. The heaters
were subsequently sold in Illinois. An Illinois resident who was injured
when the defective valve caused the heater to explode sued the Ohio corporation in Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court sustained jurisdiction finding
the valves were sold in contemplation of their use in Illinois. The court
concluded: "[l]t is not unreasonable ... to say that the use of such products
in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with this State to
justify a requirement that he [the corporate defendant] defend here." 44 Cases
following the Gray rationale have emphasized the foreign corporation's
39. The commerce clause has also been used to protect corporations from defending
actions in distant tribunals. Denver & R.G.W. R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan
Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (1929); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924);
Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923). Compare 42 HARv. L. REv. 131
(1928), with McGowan, Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 33 ILL. L. REv.

875, 877 (1939).
40. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956);
Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416, 418 (D. Minn. 1959).
41. Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923), is an example of a case
emphasizing the inconvenience of the corporate defendant.
42. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 549; Note, Civil Procedure: Personal Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations- The Economic Reality Approach, 1963 DuKE LJ.344, 348; Comment,
In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63
MICH.

L. Rav. 1028, 1031 (1965).

43. 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
44. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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sales and the consumption of its product within the forum state. 45 The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act is one of an increasing number of jurisdictional statutes that uses economic benefit as a basis for jurisdiction. 6 It allows jurisdiction over a defendant within the state for injury
resulting from acts or omissions outside the state when the defendant "derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered"
in the state.

47

Inconvenience of the Plaintiff
The decrease in emphasis on the defendant's inconvenience has been accompanied by an increase in emphasis on the plaintiff's inconvenience. This
change is manifested in such cases as McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance
Co. 4 8 In McGee the defendant, a Texas insurance company, insured a California resident by solicitation through the mails. The insurance contract,
plus payment of premiums from California, constituted the defendant's only
contact with California. A beneficiary brought suit in California to collect
on the contract. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that due process did
not preclude the California court from asserting jurisdiction over the Texas
corporation. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the plaintiff's
disadvantage if he were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant
forum in order to sue. The Court reasoned "when claims were small . . .
individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an
action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment
49
proof."
Underlying McGee are two basic concerns. One is a measurement of the
relative amount the plaintiff and corporate defendant have at stake. In
insurance cases as well as many tort cases, it is the complete loss of the
plaintiff's claim measured against the corporation's expense of defending the
suit. 50 The second concern is one analogous to the products liability concept of placing inevitable costs on the party best able to spread them.51
The high cost of distant litigation is an unavoidable expense inherent in an
45. See Wisconsin Metal & Chem. Corp. v. DeZurik Corp., 222 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wis.
1963); Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d 21 (1958);
Roland v. Modell's Shopper's World, Inc., 92 N.J. Super. I, 222 A.2d 110 (App. Div. 1966);
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 466, 209 N.E.2d
68, 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 26, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965); cf. Aftanase v. Economy Baler
Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla.
1954), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 348 U.S. 983 (1955). Contra, Dowd v. Boro Drugs,
Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 488, 176 A.2d 13 (App. Div. 1961); see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
46.

UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT §1.03.

47. Id. § 1.03 (4).
48. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
49. Id. at 223. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339
U.S. 643, 648 (1950).
50. See Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
51. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring opinion of Traynor, J.); W. PROSSER, TORTS §97 (3d ed. 1964); Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 337 (1924).
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economy composed of corporations with multistate markets and activities.
If this cost is inevitable, it should be treated as a normal expense of doing
business and thus spread among the people who enjoy the products and
services of the defendant corporation.
Interests of the Forum State
The forum state may have a direct interest in asserting jurisdiction over
foreign corporations. Such a direct interest was present in InternationalShoe,
where a Washington state agency collected unpaid unemployment contributions.52 The state also has a direct interest in assertion of jurisdiction in traditional areas of extensive state regulation. Even before InternationalShoe,
the Supreme Court allowed a wider exercise of jurisdiction in the area of
securities sales. 5 3 The extensive regulatory powers of the state over insurance
companies is one possible explanation of the liberal jurisdiction permitted in
McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.54
The state may also have an indirect interest in assertion of jurisdiction.
A state's interest in assuring that only safe products are delivered within its
borders55 is vindicated by requiring fewer factual contacts to sustain jurisdiction when the resident's injury is caused by a dangerous product. 58 A state
may rely on private actions to deter negligence and insure compensation of
injured residents. 57 This reliance may result in a broader jurisdiction when
foreign corporations commit tortious acts within the state's borders. 5s A
state interest in enforcing its resident's contracts through more liberal jurisdictional requirements has also been recognized. 59 On the other hand, a state
52. See also Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
53. See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
54. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). One view is that jurisdiction in McGee was based solely on
the state's special interest in regulating insurance companies. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 252 (1958); Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1963). The more reasonable view, however, is that this was just one of the factors considered by the court. See
Wisconsin Metal & Chem. Corp. v. DeZurik Corp., 222 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Comment, In Personam JurisdictionOver Nonresident Manufacturersin Product Liability Actions,
63 MICH. L. REv. 1028, 1030 (1965). The latter view is supported by the cases, which did not

concern regulated industries, cited by the court in McGee. See 355 U.S. at 223 n.2 citing
S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 348 U.S. 983 (1955), Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d

664 (1951).
55. Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 929

(1960).
56. For cases concerning dangerous products see Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343
F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); W. H. Elliot & Sons v. Nuodex Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir.
1957); Roland v. Modell's Shopper's World, Inc., 92 N.J. Super. 1, 222 A.2d 110 (App. Div.
1966); Hoagland v. Springer, 75 N.J. Super. 560, 183 A.2d 678 (App. Div.), afJ'd, 39 N.J.
32, 186 A.2d 679 (1962).
57.

Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 926 (1960).

58. This state interest in assuring injured residents a convenient forum
force behind the early acceptance of nonresident motorist statutes as not
due process clause. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
59. See MD. ANN. CoDE, art. 23, §92 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN.
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may wish to limit, rather than broaden, the jurisdictional power of its courts
in order to encourage foreign corporations to do business within the state.6 0
Interest in Efficient JudicialAdministration
In Travelers Health Association v. Virginia ex rel. State Corporation
Commission,61 the Supreme Court supported the reasonableness of subjecting
a Nebraska insurance corporation to suits in Virginia by pointing out that
"suits on alleged losses can be more conveniently tried in Virginia where
witnesses would most likely live and where claims for losses would presumably be investigated."6 2 In noting these factors, the Court emphasized the
importance of the forum where the cause of action could most efficiently be
63

tried.

Another factor considered in choosing the most efficient forum for trial
is whether the law to be applied is that of the forum state or a foreign state.
Application of foreign law was considered in Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos
Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A. 6 4 In that case, a New York resident sued a Brazilian

airline corporation in New York. One of the factors considered in deciding
the jurisdictional question was the problem of interpreting the unique Civil
Law concept of "Dolus." The defendant contended this concept could more
readily be dealt with by a Brazilian court, which had both a working
knowledge of the Civil Law and ability to understand Portuguese speaking
witnesses.65
Multiplicity of suits also affects the efficiency of judicial administration.
This factor was important in Hoagland v. Springer,66 where the plaintiff,
a New Jersey resident, sued a New Jersey individual, a New Jersey truck
dealer, a Michigan corporation, and an Indiana corporation in a New Jersey
court. In sustaining jurisdiction over the Indiana corporation, the court
pointed out that compelling the corporation to defend in New Jersey would
avoid multiple suits against the New Jersey, Indiana, and Michigan defendants.67

1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-145

(1959); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b

(1964); VT.

STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §855 (1959).

60. See Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 863, 323 P.2d 437, 442
(1958) (dissenting opinion); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1028, 1043 (1965).
61. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
62. Id. at 649.
63. The factors affecting efficient judicial administration are often considered under
the concept of forum non conveniens. For the relationship between forum non conveniens
and the minimal contacts test see Latimer v. S/A Industries Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175
F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1949); Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948).
64. 232 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
65. The court sustained jurisdiction on other grounds.
66. 74 N.J. Super. 275, 181 A.2d 193 (Super. Ct.), aff'd, 75 N.J. Super. 560, 183 A.2d
678 (App. Div.), aff'd, 39 N.J. 32, 186 A.2d 679 (1962).
67. Id. at 284-85, 181 A.2d at 199.
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The Interests: Balanced and Applied - Hanson v. Denckla

The relative weight of these four interests varies with the individual
facts of each case, but the most recent Supreme Court case applying the
minimal contacts test, Hanson v. Denckla,68 gives some indication of priorities
among these interests. Hanson concerned a trust established in Delaware.
The settlor later moved to Florida where she corresponded with the Delaware
trustee and made an appointment under the trust which caused the litigation.
The question before the Court was whether the Delaware trustee had sufficient
"minimal contacts" with Florida to be subject to Florida's jurisdiction. A
five-man majority, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, concluded
that the trustee was not subject to Florida's jurisdiction. The majority found
no compelling state interest and distinguished McGee on the ground that it
concerned insurance, an area of broad state regulatory discretion. In addition,
the majority felt the trustee had not voluntarily engaged in any significant
activities in Florida, such as solicitation of business. The trustee's correspondence with the settlor was characterized as merely "unilateral activity" on the
latter's part. Finally, while conceding Florida was the most convenient location for trial, the majority concluded that no matter how "minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon
to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that state that are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power . -.-- 69 Four Justices in two dissents put
primary emphasis on interests other than inconvenience of the defendant.
The dissenters placed greater emphasis on the convenience of the Florida
forum pointing out that almost all interested parties were domiciled there.
Mr. Justice Black noted that Florida was "seriously concerned with winding
up Mrs. Donner's [the settlor's] estate and with finally determining what
property was to be distributed under her will."7° Mr. Justice Douglas balanced
the inconveniences of the litigants in favor of the plaintiff, considering the
trustee as a mere stakeholder and thus having much less concern in the
litigation than the plaintiffs. In conclusion, a closely divided court ranked
inconvenience of the corporate defendant as paramount where the defendant
had not engaged in any more voluntary activity in the forum state than maintaining a prior business relationship. But it should be noted that four
Justices found other interests to be controlling.
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE: AN EXAiMiPLE OF THE NEED FOR INTEREST ANALYSIS

Florida's experience is typical of states that have attempted by statute
to take advantage of the expanded jurisdictional power allowed by International Shoe. Florida's statutory response to International Shoe was Florida
Statutes, section 47.16 (1), enacted in 1951. The pertinent language is:71

68. 357 US. 235 (1958).
69. Id. at 251.

70. Id. at 259.
71.

FLA. STAT. §47.16 (1) (1965).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

9

UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
Florida
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
20, Iss. 1

[1967], Art. 3[Vol.

XX

The acceptance by any person or persons . . .and all foreign corporations . . .of the privilege extended by law . . . to operate, conduct,
engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the state . . .
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such persons and
foreign corporations of the secretary of state of the state as the agent
• . .upon whom may be served . . .process in any action . . . arising
out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to
such business or business venture ....
Process may be served on foreign corporations under this statute either by
registered mail72 or by service on various officials of the foreign corporation
3
who may be personally present in Florida.7
The first Florida Supreme Court case to interpret section 47.16, State ex
rel. Guardian Credit Indemnity Corp. v. Harrison,74 promised a liberal reading
of the statute. The foreign corporation in Harrison had obtained a license
to carry on its credit insurance business in Florida. Since licensing required
the corporation to give actual consent to suit in Florida,7 5 there was no need
to consider the constitutional due process test enunciated in International
Shoe.76 In spite of this, the court used the language and reasoning of International Shoe to decide the case, thus implying that the standard of section
47.16 was identical with that enunciated in InternationalShoe. In addition,
the court looked to the future contractual obligations of the corporation,
finding that they would necessitate performance in Florida. This was an
expansion of InternationalShoe, which had considered only the present and
past activity of the foreign corporation.
In 1957, the Florida legislature added section (2) to the present section
47.16. This amendment was precipitated by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc.77 In Berkman a
Delaware corporation formed a subsidiary Delaware corporation to establish
and operate a business in Florida. The subsidiary was closely controlled by
the parent corporation both having substantially the same officers and
directors. The parent corporation was subsequently sued in the Florida
courts under section 47.16 for breach of a lease the subsidiary had executed.
When the Florida plaintiff attempted to enforce the Florida default judgment
in New York, the defendant contended that the Florida court did not obtain
jurisdiction under section 47.16. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied
on a 1925 Supreme Court Case, Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co.,7 8 in deciding the case. Cannon held that where parent and subsidiary
maintain separate corporate entities - as demonstrated by separate bookkeeping facilities, bank accounts, tax returns, and financial statements - the

72.

FLA. STAT. §47.30 (1965).

73. FLA. STAT. §§47.17-.171 (1965).
74. 74 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1954).
75. Cf. Confederation of Canada Life Ins. Co. v. Vega y Arminan, 144 So. 2d 805 (Fla.
1962). The best discussion of the distinction between "actual" and "implied" consent is in
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (L. Hand, J.).
76. The minimal contacts test of International Shoe concerns the state's power to force
a corporation, in the absence of actual consent, to defend a suit in the forum state.
77. 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957).
78. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
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parent is not amenable to suit because of its subsidiary's activities in the
forum state. The court concluded that the Florida Legislature had not intended to overrule the Cannon precedent by section 47.16. 79 The Florida
Legislature responded to Berkman by adding the following section to section
47.16:80
Any person, firm or corporation which through brokers, jobbers,
wholesalers, or distributors sells, consigns, or leases, by any means whatsoever, tangible or intangible personal property, to any person, firm or
corporation in this state, shall be conclusively presumed to be
operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business or business venture in this state.
Florida case law has interpreted this section to sustain jurisdiction only when
the foreign corporation (1) has some degree of control over the personal
property while in the hands of the Florida distributor or (2) has some degree
of control over the Florida distributor."" As thus interpreted, the amendment
overrules the Cannon precedent and supports jurisdiction over a foreign
2
parent corporation.
Although the amendment was intended to expand Florida's jurisdiction,
it has had the opposite effect. Other states have permitted jurisdiction simply
because the foreign corporation's products are sold in the forum state in the
normal course of business. 8 3 This jurisdictional expansion in other states
has been supported on two grounds: (1) a corporation should defend in a
state where it derives its lifegiving profits, and (2) between the corporate defendant and the individual plaintiff, the corporation is best able to spread
the cost of litigating in foreign tribunals. The Florida courts have been
unable to follow this trend because of the restrictive interpretation of section
47.16 (2), which was designed primarily to overrule the Cannon decision.
Consequently, Florida does not have jurisdiction in situations where foreign
corporations merely sell their products in Florida without using controlled
distributors.8 4 The Florida experience with section 47.16 (2) and the Cannon
rule demonstrate the danger of engrafting judicial interpretative limitations
on statutes designed to expand jurisdiction. Such mechanical limitations restrict analysis of underlying interests to a narrower range than the assertion
of jurisdiction over foreign corporations should ultimately consider.
In cases not involving foreign corporations, Florida courts have shown
a greater aptitude for analyzing basic economic interests to settle jurisdic79. 246 F.2d at 49.
80. FLA. STAT. §47.16 (2) (1965).
81. Jenkins v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Fla. 1962); Fawcett
Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So. 2d 512 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); Fawcett Publications, Inc.
v. Brown, 146 So. 2d 899 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
82. Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 32 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964), Deere & Co. v. Watts, 148 So. 2d 529 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
83. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
84. Cases cited note 81 supra. See Cook-Waite Laboratories, Inc. v. Napier, 166 So. 2d
675 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Newark Ladder & Bracket Co. v. Eadie, 125 So. 2d 915 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
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tional issues. For example, in State ex rel. Weber v. Register,5 several nonresidents purchased a Florida orange grove. Subsequently the grove was
listed for sale with a Florida broker. The broker, using section 47.16, later
sued the nonresidents for his commission. The Florida Supreme Court distinguished "a business" and "business venture," as used in section 47.16, and
found that while listing of the grove for sale was not incidental to "a business," the act was a "business venture."' 6 In terming this action a "business
venture" the court was no doubt considering the profit and business nature of
the transaction s7 A profit motive, however, is not the only economic interest
that can sustain jurisdiction over a nonresident individual. In Florida Investment Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co.8s the nonresident defendant, a
surety on the lease of a Florida motel, argued she did not contemplate deriving a pecuniary benefit from operation of the motel and thus did not come
within the terms of section 47.16. The court rejected this contention finding
the over-all business nature of the defendant's suretyship duties under the
lease sufficient to support jurisdiction.8 9 On the other hand, "the isolated
action of selling a home by one who moves to another state, does not amount
to a business venture ... ."90 and thus section 47.16 does not sustain jurisdiction. These decisions involving nonresident persons illustrate the underlying
considerations that demand amenability to suit as the quid pro quo for deriving profit within the State of Florida. Certainly, the reason for requiring
commercial enterprises to defend suits in a state where they seek gain from
business activity should apply with equal force to corporations.
The most severe limitation on the Florida plaintiff's ability to obtain
jurisdiction over foreign corporations is the requirement that the cause of
action must "arise out of" the corporation's activities within the state. This
limitation was first enunciated in Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co.91 In that case,
the defendant, a Delaware pharmaceutical corporation with a regional office
in Georgia, solicitated orders by salesmen in Florida working under two
district managers. The plaintiff attempted to obtain jurisdiction over the
corporation by serving process on one of the district managers. 92 The Supreme Court of Florida in denying jurisdiction, recognized that the corporation was doing business within the state but felt the statute was intended
to apply only to obligations arising out of the corporation's activities within
93

the state.

85. 67 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
86. Id. at 620.
87. See also W. E. Strasser Constr. Corp. v. Linn, 97 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1957).
88. 160 So. 2d 733 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).

89. Id. at 740.
90. Hayes v. Greenwald, 149 So. 2d 586, 587 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); see James v. Kush,
157 So. 2d 203 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); see also Toffel v. Baugher, 125 So. 2d 321 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1960), cert. denied, 133 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1961).

91. 128 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1961).
92. The district manager was served under

FLA. STAT.

§47.171 (1965).

This statute

provides in part: "[P]rocess directed to any foreign corporation failing to comply with said
sections [§§47.34-36] may be served upon any agent of such foreign corporation transacting

business for it in Florida."
93. The plaintiff in Zirin sued for money payable for work and services rendered, ac-
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The Florida Supreme Court found two justifications for the "arising-outof" requirement. In Zirin the court thought the due process clause demanded
such a requirement9 4 The court supported this conclusion in the later case
of Illinois Central R.R. v. Simari95 by quoting the following language from
International Shoe concerning the privilege of doing business within the
forum state: 98
"The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so
far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond
to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said
to be undue. [Emphasis added.]"
Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court has both misinterpreted International Shoe and ignored subsequent developments in the interpretation
of the due process clause. The whole thrust of International Shoe was that
mechanical limitations could not be employed in applying the minimal contacts test. In fact, the words from InternationalShoe quoted by the Florida
Supreme Court in Simari were substantially qualified in International Shoe:
"There have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from
those activities."9 Any argument that International Shoe required such a
limitation was settled by the subsequent Supreme Court case of Perkins v.
Benquet ConsolidatedMining Co.98 Perkins held squarely that the due process
clause does not restrict a state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations to
causes of action arising out of the corporations' activities in the forum state. 99
The Florida Supreme Court's second rationale for the arising-out-of
limitation was that the language of section 47.16 states such a requirement. 10
It is conceded that this is a possible interpretation of the statute. 01 This
statutory limitation, however, precludes consideration of the underlying
counts due, and interest. There was no proof connecting these claims with the defendant
corporation's activities in the state. This failure of proof defeated the plaintiff's attempt
to use §47.16. 128 So. 2d at 600.
94. 128 So. 2d at 599; accord, Giannini Controls Corp. v. Eubanks, 190 So. 2d 171 (Fla.
1966).
95. 191 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1966).
96. Id. at 428.
97. 326 US. at 318.
98. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
99. Id. at 440, 446.
100. In Zirin the Florida Supreme Court purported to interpret FLA. STAT. §47.171
(1965). This statute contains no language on which to base an arising-out-of limitation.
Section 47.16 does contain a possible basis for such a limitation in the following language:
"[A]rising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to such business
or business venture." In a subsequent case, Giannini Controls Corp. v. Eubanks, 190 So. 2d
171 (Fla. 1966), the Florida Supreme Court stated that the wording of §47.16 does impose
an arising-out-of limitation.
101. The language of §47.16 - "[A]rising out of any transaction or operation connected
with or incidental to such business or business venture" - is susceptible to a more liberal
interpretation than the arising-out-of formulation adopted by the Florida courts.
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interests that must be balanced if a fair and reasonable result is to be reached.
For example, in Zirin the corporate defendant sold extensively and systematically in Florida, but despite this profit-producing activity was immune
from Florida litigation. In addition, the defendant had employees within
the state, whereas the individual plaintiff had no similar agents in a state
where he could sue the defendant. The unfairness that can result from this
restrictive interpretation is further illustrated by Illinois Central R.R. v.
Simari.102 In Simari a Florida resident brought suit for injuries sustained on
the corporate defendant's railroad in St. Louis, Missouri. The defendant
had no trains or tracks in Florida but maintained two offices and thirteen
permanent employees in the state. These employees solicited and routed passengers and freight for interstate trips originating in Florida, but the connecting carrier and not the defendant's employees sold the plaintiff her
ticket in Florida. The court emphasized this latter fact and found that the
cause of action did not arise out of the corporation's Florida activities. The
court thus not only ignored the fact that the connecting carrier should be
considered the defendant's agent for purposes of selling the ticket,103 but
also failed to consider several interests important to a fair result. First, the
State of Florida has an interest in insuring that its residents are compensated
for tortious injuries and also in requiring due care of railroads that solicit
business in Florida. Second, as between the plaintiff and corporate defendant,
it was more just that the latter bear the costs of interstate litigation so that
such costs would ultimately be spread over the entire consumer population as
an unavoidable element of the service's cost. Third, forcing the defendant to
travel to Missouri to sue might well deprive her of her cause of action because
of prohibitive costs. Fourth, the burden on the defendant of defending in
Florida was not undue in light of its resident permanent employees. A
counterbalancing consideration was the nonresident status of some witnesses.
Thus, both Zirin and Simari reach highly questionable results and illustrate
the danger of setting out concrete requirements for jurisdiction that preclude
consideration of underlying interests.
In summary, Florida law has had a mixed and generally restrictive evolution since the first liberal interpretation of section 47.16. Derivation of economic benefit in Florida, even though systematic and extensive, will not alone
sustain jurisdiction. In addition, the cause of action must arise out of the corporation's activities within the state. In contrast to these evolving restrictions,
the Florida courts have shown an ability to analyze underlying economic
factors in cases concerning jurisdiction over nonresident individuals in the
limited area of land transactions.
THE MOST APPROPRIATE TEST FOR JURISDICTION OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

The assertion of jurisdiction over foreign corporations is a matter of
102. 191 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1966).
103. Scholnik v. National Airlines, 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955); cf. Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929); Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A., 232 F.
Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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state legislative discretion. 104 Thus, a state may exercise varying degrees of
jurisdictional power restricted only at the outer limits by the due process,
minimal contacts test of International Shoe. As illustrated above, Florida
has elected to exercise a degree of jurisdiction over foreign corporations that
falls short of the full jurisdictional power permissible.
In light of all factors, the minimal contacts test is superior to the statutory-based test applied in Florida. The minimal contacts test balances underlying interests to reach a goal of fairness and substantial justice -certainly
appropriate goals for any legal rule. Because it balances underlying interests,
the minimum contacts test can develop to meet the changing social and
economic patterns of modern life. In comparison, the Florida test focuses
on such requirements as the arising-out-of limitation which often precludes
consideration of underlying interests and disregards the ultimate goal of
fairness. Moreover, Florida's test, circumscribed by legal limitations, cannot
change to meet evolving social and economic patterns.
The major fault of the minimal contacts test is vagueness. 0 5 To an
extent, however, this vagueness results from the many cases that purport to
apply the test, but actually focus only on factual contacts and not on underlying interests. 10 8 The criticism of vagueness is valid insofar as any test that
must consider diverse interests so as to achieve fairness in varying fact situations cannot be drawn with unyielding precision. A concrete statutory test
does not avoid the problem of vagueness, however. State courts often must
apply the minimal contacts standard in testing the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction in a particular factual situation. 10 7 Thus a state that adopts
a statutory standard often forces its courts to apply both the due process test
and the state statutory test. Such a dual test leads to confusion.108 In addition, there is a historical tendency for state courts to interpret strict statutory
tests so that over a period of time they evolve toward the broader due process
test. 09 Such a tendency may rob the statutory test of concreteness and predictability." 0
104. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
105. Stimson, Omnibus Statutes Designed To Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State
Defendants, 48 A.BA.J. 725 (1962).

106. Cases cited note 38 supra.
107. See, e.g., Bradbery v. Frank L. Savage Co., 190 So. 2d 183 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
Compania De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 943 (1954); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
108. In H. Bell & Associates v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., 140 So. 2d 125 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1962), the court confuses a requirement of due process with the distinction between two

statutes.
109. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 468, 209
N.E.2d 68, 82, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 27, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965) (concurring opinion);
Note, Recent Interpretationsof "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IowA L. Ry-. 345, 347 (1959);
Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. CHM.L. REv. 523, 525 n.14

(1949).
110. Compare Heliegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957) [and]
Nelson v. Miller, 11 II. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957), with McMahon v. Boeing Airplane
Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. I1. 1961) [and] Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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The statutory test may be defended as embodying state policies designed
to limit jurisdiction- policies that cannot be reflected in the minimum contacts test. But the conclusion that there are valid state policies for restricting
jurisdiction often results from questionable judicial assumptions concerning
legislative intent and not from the linguistic demands of the statute. For
example, when subsection (2) was added to section 47.16, the following
statement of legislative intent appeared in the preamble:111
WHEREAS ... corporations in other jurisdictions are directly or indirectly furnishing millions of dollars worth of tangible and intangible personal property to persons, firms and corporations in this state
each year; and
WHEREAS, litigation in both tort and contract frequently arises
out ot the purchase . . . use anti consumption of such property each
year; and
WHEREAS, the cost and expense of going to other jurisdictions ...
frequently has the practical effect of denying all rights and remedies
regarding such purchase.., use and consumption; and
WHEREAS, it is just and fair that such litigation be conducted in
this state rather than in a foreign jurisdiction ....
In spite of this expression of legislative intent, Florida case law limits the
jurisdiction under section 47.16 (2) to cases in which the foreign corporation
has a significant presales control over its distributor in the state.1 12 But in
situations where the corporation does not control its distributor, the courts
have reasoned there is no statutory authority to sustain jurisdiction.113 This
control limitation is not required by the statutory language. In addition, the
limitation nullifies that portion of the legislature's intent, as expressed in
the preamble, which contemplates jurisdiction where foreign corporations
market a large quantity of goods in the state regardless of the method of
distribution. Thus, the supposed lack of statutory authority is the product of
judicial assumption and not actual legislative policy.
In light of this judicial tendency to create limitations on broad statutory
grants of jurisdiction, the best approach is to adopt the broadest permissible
test of jurisdiction- the minimum contacts test. This approach assures all
the advantages of interest-balancing, and yet gives the legislature, not the
judiciary, the power to determine state policy and to enact specific jurisdictional limitations.
IMPLEIMENTATION OF THE MINIMAL CONTACTS TEST

A state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations is controlled by statutory
enactment.114 Florida Statutes, section 47.16, is one attempt to implement
111.

Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-747, at 1067.

112. Cases cited note 81 supra.
113. The court in Jenkins v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 361, 364 (N.D. Fla.
1962) stated: "This court finds no authority in the Florida Statutes upon which to predicate a holding making every manufacturer whose goods are ultimately sold in Florida by
independent stores . . . amenable to substituted service of process in the courts of the State."
114. Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial
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some aspects of the minimal contacts standard by general statutory language.
Recently the statutory approach most often adopted is the single-act statute."15
These statutes codify the specific factual contact or contacts with the forum
state that are sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. 116 But single-act statutes create
serious problems.
The major problem is the enumeration of factual contacts that go to the
outer limits of the jurisdiction permitted by due process and yet do not exceed
the constitutionally permissible limit in particular fact situations."1 Due
process, as defined by International Shoe's minimal contacts test, requires
an analysis of all factors in a case.' 18 Thus, while the prescribed statutory
contact may be present, the other circumstances of the case, considered and
balanced as the minimal contact test requires, may cause the assertion of
jurisdiction to violate the due process clause. This problem is illustrated by
two cases interpreting a Minnesota statute that provides jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation "if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole
or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota ... .",19 In Mueller
v. Steelcase, Inc.,

20

the Minnesota resident sued a Michigan corporation for

injuries sustained when an office chair collapsed. The court found that the
chair was sold through an independent Minnesota retailer, that the defendant
made no contacts with potential customers and did not advertise his products
in Minnesota, and that most of the potential witnesses were in Michigan. On
these facts the court concluded that the statute's application placed too great
a burden on the corporate defendant and therefore violated due process. In
Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.,121 the Minnesota plaintiff sued another Michigan corporation for injuries sustained while working on one of the defendant's
Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. Rxv. 249, 265, 267 (1959); Developments in the Law: State-Court
jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 1015 (1960); Comment, In Personam jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 Micr.L. REv. 1028 (1965).
115. Note, Single Act Statutes and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 43 VA.

L. REv. 1105, 1106 (1957); see statutes cited note 29 supra and statutes listed in Note,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 48 IoWA L. Rtv. 204, 206-07 (1962).
116. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §302 (McKinney Supp. 1966) is the most complete singleact statute. It provides: "Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domidliaries (a) Acts which
are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary,
or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the state; or 2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act, or 3. commits a tortious act without
the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action
for defamation of character arising from the act, if he (i) regularly does or solicits business,
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce; or 4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated
within the state."
117. Cf. Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial
Jurisdiction,44 IowA L. REV. 249, 265-67 (1959).
118.
119.
120.

See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
MINN. STAT. ANN.

§303.13 (Supp. 1966).

172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959).

121. 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir, 1965).
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scrap metal balers. The court in this case sustained jurisdiction, emphasizing
the dangerous nature of the machine and the sales promotion and maintenance activities of the defendant in Minnesota. In both cases the statutory
factual contact of tortious injury was present. But the other factors were
sufficiently different to cause the assertion of jurisdiction to be unconstitutional in one case but constitutional in the other.
Another problem caused by the enumeration of factual contacts in singleact statutes is the difficulty courts have in interpreting the technical statutory
language. For example, in the Illinois statute a foreign corporation is subject to suit for "the commission of a tortious act within this state."'1 2 The
Illinois Supreme Court first stated that the statute applied where "the defendant, personally or through an agent, is the author of acts or omissions within
the State ....
123 A federal district court, following this pronouncement,
found that the statute did not apply where all acts of negligence occurred outside the state, even though the tortious injury occurred in Illinois. 12 4 Subsequently the Illinois court changed its position stating that negligent acts
could not be separated from resulting tortious injury, and thus applied the
statute where only the tortious injury alone occurred within the state.1 25 The
court reasoned that to differentiate between negligent acts and resulting damage would "promote litigation over extraneous issues concerning the elements
of a tort and the territorial incidence of each, whereas the test should be
concerned more with those substantial elements of convenience and justice
presumably contemplated by the legislature."126s In contrast, when faced with
identical statutory language the New York Court of Appeals chose a more
strict interpretation. The New York court believed that "conferring personal
jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary 'if . . . he . . . commits a tortious act
within the state'-is too plain and precise to permit it to be read . . . as if

it were synonymous with 'commits a tortious act without the state which causes
injury within the state.' "127 These cases demonstrate that expansion of jurisdiction by single-act statutes may result in serious confusion when courts
122.

ILL.

ANN. STAT.

ch. 110, §17 (1)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966). The complete sub-

division (1) of the Illinois statute reads: " (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative,
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the

doing of any of such acts: (a) The transaction of any business within this State; (b) The
commission of a tortious act within this State; (c) The ownership, use, or possession of any
real estate situated in this State; (d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk
located within this State at the time of contracting; (e) With respect to actions of divorce
and separate maintenance, the maintenance in this State of a matrimonial domicile at the
time the cause of action arose or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to the
cause of action."
123. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 393, 143 N.E.2d 673, 681 (1957).
124. Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
125. Gray v. American Radiator g- Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
126. Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763. Accord, McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F.
Supp. 908 (N.D. I1. 1961).

127. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 460, 209
N.E.2d 68, 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 21, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
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disagree over the technical meaning of statutory language. But more important, entanglement in semantics results in judicial disregard of considera128
tions of fairness and over-all state policy.
-In the absence of new legislation, such as single-act statutes, state courts
have liberalized their interpretation of pre-InternationalShoe "doing business"
statutes so as to include more factual situations. 12 9 California is the most
extreme example of this liberalization because its courts have interpreted an
1872 "doing business" statute' 30 as equivalent to the minimal contacts test of
International Shoe.' 3' The reasoning behind such an interpretation, according to Chief Justice Traynor:3 2
[D]oing business was adopted as a test not for immunity but for jurisdiction, consonant with the then tenor of the due process clause. Any
test of jurisdiction geared to its then tenor and expressed in pliant
language was therefore no more than illustrative of .. .the jurisdictional concepts of that period. As those concepts became more flexible
the courts found that the wording of the 1872 statute yielded a correspondingly flexible meaning.
The California approach to expansion of jurisdiction avoids all the problems
that statutory expansion entails. But this approach is unavailable where the
jurisdictional statute is explicit and not "pliant" in its language and where
the state courts are unwilling to take a progressive position concerning jurisdiction.
The most successful implementation of the minimal contacts test has
taken place in New Jersey. There, by court rule, extraterritorial service of
process is permitted, subject only to "due process of law."' 33 New Jersey

128.

Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product

Liability Actions, 63 Micn. L. REv. 1028, 1036, 1039 (1965). In Compania De Astral, SA.
v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1954), the

court used technical contract principles of offer and acceptance in deciding the applicability
of the statute.
129.

Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 Iowa L. Rav. 345,

359 (1959).
130. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §411 (Deering 1959). This section reads in part: "2. If the
suit is against a foreign corporation, or a non-resident joint stock company or association,
doing business in this State; in the manner provided by Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of

the Corporations Code."
131. Empire Steel Corp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502, 17 Cal. Rptr.
150 (1961); Carl F. W. Borgward G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 72, 330 P.2d 789
(1958); Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d 21 (1958);
the California Supreme Court has stated: "'Doing business' within the meaning of section

411 of the Code of Civil Procedure is synonymous with the power of the state to subject
foreign corporations to local process." Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d
855, 858, 323 P.2d 437, 439 (1958).
132. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TuxmS L. Rv.657, 658-59 (1959).

133. N.J. Rules 4:4-4 (d).
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courts have interpreted this rule to allow exercise of jurisdiction to the outermost limits permitted by the Federal Constitution."3 In Roland v. Modell's
36
3
Shopper's World, Inc. 5 the court stated:
Our rule contains no definitions, limitations or exceptions. To paraphrase a popular song, anything any state can do under the Federal
Constitution we can do, and if a state is limited by the terms of its
statutes or rules, we can do it better. Hence, we do not need to struggle
with the oft difficult problems of statutory construction faced by courts
in states with detailed "long arm statutes."
The New Jersey approach avoids all the problems of statutory implementation. In addition, this approach leaves the state legislature the power to
enact specific limitations in areas where, for policy reasons, they are deemed
necessary.
CONCLUSION

The minimal contacts test of International Shoe, with its flexibility and
emphasis on fairness, is the best existing test for determining jurisdiction over
foreign corporations. The most effective method of implementing this test
is that adopted by New Jersey, which allows jurisdiction only subject to due
process of law. This method directly adopts the minimum contacts due process test. Because this test balances underlying societal and economic interests
its application can change as these underlying interests change. In addition,
the court's tendency to engraft judicial limitations by interpreting statutory
language is curbed. The power to enact specific jurisdictional restrictions for
state policy reasons is therefore reserved to the state legislature. By avoiding
statutory limitations, the New Jersey approach allows all the underlying
interests to be considered and balanced. The dangers of bogging down in
technical statutory language is avoided by adopting a test that avoids the
need for extensive statutory language. The due process test also avoids the
confusion that results from the application of both a statutory test and the
due process test. Although the minimal contacts test is vague, such vagueness
is inherent in any test that attempts to balance a number of conflicting interests to reach a fair result in each case.
A statute based on the New Jersey approach might be phrased:
Service of process may be made by any statutory method on any foreign
corporation subject only to the limitations of due process of law.
This sparseness of statutory language reflects the fact that the minimal contacts test is more a method of judicial reasoning than a mechanical application of legal rules or statutory language.
134. Roland v. Modell's Shopper's World, Inc., 92 N.J. Super. 1, 222 A.2d 110 (App.
Div. 1966); Dowd v. Boro Drugs, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 488, 176 A.2d 13 (App. Div. 1961);
Hoagland v. Springer, 74 N.J. Super. 275, 181 A.2d 193 (Super. Ct.), afl'd, 75 N.J. Super.
560, 183 A.2d 678 (App. Div.), af'd, 39 N.J. 32, 186 A.2d 679 (1962).

135. 92 N.J. Super. 1,222 A.2d 110 (App. Div. 1966).
136. 92 N.J. Super. at 7, 222 A.2d at 113.
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